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**RESTRUCTURING THE ARMED FORCES TO MEET U.S.  
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS THROUGH 2015**

BY

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## ABSTRACT

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Composed primarily of conventional forces, with nuclear deterrent capability, America's military is obsolete for post cold war realities. The United States is the world's only superpower. A credible peer competitor does not exist to challenge the U.S. nor is one expected through the year 2015. Instead, the world has changed to one fraught with asymmetric threats, which strike at the Achilles heel of U.S. conventional strategy and force structure.

Force structure and strategy changes are inevitable as the military struggles with its identity crisis in a world that is changing at an ever-increasing rate. The opportunity now exists to dramatically reduce the size and cost of the armed forces by transferring the bulk of its conventional capability to the reserves, while maintaining lethal and highly mobile units in the active force to deal with asymmetric threats. A revolutionary restructuring of the military not only prepares it to fight the next war, but also recognizes budgetary realities of the years ahead.



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## RESTRUCTURING THE ARMED FORCES TO MEET U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS THROUGH 2015

"It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but rather the most adaptable to change".

— Charles Darwin

The high water mark of America's military strength occurred in 1991, just before its dismantling was initiated in concert with the cold war's demise. At the time, America possessed the most powerful military known to mankind. That military was not created by accident or by a simple pouring in of money and technology. It was built by the painstaking efforts of those who now serve at the military's highest levels of command.

These architects deserve great praise for their achievements and sacrifices. These leaders survived the tumultuous period of the Vietnam War. Most of them are highly decorated combat veterans who fought bravely in the jungles, in the air, or on the waters of Southeast Asia. They fulfilled their sacred vow to fix the broken military that struggled for identity in the 1970s. These same leaders are the ones who developed candor within the junior officer corps, created an environment that permitted mistakes, and rewarded thinking "outside the box". Coupled with the Reagan dollars of the 1980s

and the reinvigorated command climate, these leaders built the greatest military known to man. A military force that ended the 40-year cold war and displayed itself in such awesome spectacle during the Gulf War, that it transformed the world's view of modern warfare. In fact, many strategists suggest that conventional warfare has been made virtually obsolete. This position serves as the foundation of this paper, which advocates the necessity for revolutionary force structure changes to meet the national security challenges through 2015.

### **DEMISE OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

Jeffrey Record, a knowledgeable writer on security issues, observed that: "The evidence to date points to the end of a military era that began with the French Revolution, and to the beginning of an era characterized in part by a return to smaller wars and lesser military enterprises conducted by lesser armies on behalf of discrete political objectives."<sup>1</sup> This revolution in military affairs is understood by our senior military leaders as well as by our adversaries. However, the questions to be considered are: can America's military leaders who were instrumental in the buildup of the most powerful military force in history, transition it to adequately respond to defeat new threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? And, is the evolutionary process

employed by these senior leaders over the past eight years the best method to prepare the military to ensure the security of the Nation?

An examination of current doctrine and force structure indicates that our military service components are inextricably tied to their conventional pasts. The services are intent on fighting yesterday's wars in a world that has shifted to a new paradigm fraught with asymmetrical threats and domestic well being and circumspection. In this paper, I will illustrate the critical issues and changing environment that will affect our military strategy and I will explain why a revolutionary change in our strategy and especially our force structure is essential.

In the current National Security Strategy document, the President states: "For the foreseeable future, the United States, preferably in concert with its allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."<sup>2</sup> This strategy and the force structure now in place to carry it out have been developed by strategists who have failed to recognize the changing world environment and paradigm shift of threats to our national security. Jeffery Record argues that: ". . . the scenario of the post-Cold War U.S. military being called upon to wage simultaneously two big conventional wars, on the order of the Gulf War and a new Korean War, speaks much more

to the internal interests of the armed forces than it speaks to the external strategic environment."<sup>3</sup> Composed primarily of conventional forces, with nuclear deterrent capability, current military forces are obsolete for post cold war realities.

Record also states:

Many students of international politics have remarked upon the disappearance of great power warfare since 1945, but there is little agreement on either the causes or the durability of this stunning phenomenon. What is clear is that the scope and incidence of large-scale interstate warfare has sharply - and unexpectedly - declined over the past half-century, and that there are no impressive portents of its sustained re-eruption in the near future.<sup>4</sup>

"Our nation is at peace and much of the world embraces the democratic ideals we cherish."<sup>5</sup> "Former adversaries now cooperate with us."<sup>6</sup> These last two statements, which were taken from the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy documents, portray a world that is generally accepted as secure and stable. In 1993, the Department of Defense was given the task by the former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, to perform a comprehensive examination of security risks and defense strategy — "a bottoms up review". The findings, which were incorporated in the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), assert that a global peer competitor or regional great power may not emerge until beyond the 2010-2015 period. The report's view on

the global security environment also portrays a very positive outlook as we approach the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The report predicts:

On the positive side of the ledger, we are in a period of strategic opportunity. The threat of global war has receded and our core values of representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation between nations. The sustained dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture, and global interactions. Our alliances, such as NATO, the U.S. - Japan alliance, and the U.S. - Republic of Korea alliance, which have been so critical to U.S. security, are adapting successfully to meet today's challenges and provide the foundation for a remarkably stable and prosperous world. Former adversaries, like Russia and other former members of the Warsaw Pact, now cooperate with us across a range of security issues. In fact, many in the world see the United States as the security partner of choice.<sup>7</sup>

Taking these assessments at face value, we can conclude that the world is a much safer place to live. Moreover, if one compares the current world environment in relative terms with any other era of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the assessment would be similarly optimistic.

Critics would argue that I have taken comments out of context and that the world is still dangerous, unstable, and unpredictable. They would support their claims with the fact that our military forces presently have the highest level of operational commitments and overseas deployments, or Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) of recent history. To argue these issues, I

would first submit that except for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, no other definitive or specific aggressor was identified as a conventional threat to U.S. security in the QDR or National Military Strategy documents. Instead, these documents present asymmetric challenges, uncertainty, and transnational dangers. While I do not dismiss any of these threats, I do believe it is fiscally irresponsible and a waste of our precious national resources to maintain a large standing military with conventional forces that not only outweigh our needs, but are also asymmetrically opposed.

With regard to the military's OPTEMPO, I agree that our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are grossly over burdened by unrelenting and seemingly never-ending commitments for deployments and exercises. I submit that many of their missions were, and now are, unnecessary and would not have been conducted if forces were not readily available to perform them, in a typically military "can do" manner. Moreover, the services have been and continue to be overly stressed operationally by a variety of problematic circumstances. These include the service's requirement to maintain conventional proficiency while committed to non-conventional missions and to maintain their equipment without adequate resources or personnel. Shortages of personnel exacerbate the service's problems by requiring current personnel to perform multiple roles as each individual is

required to do more with less, as well as, preventing critically needed continuity overlap of key replacements. Senior leaders from all of the services are frequently highlighting the stressful conditions and deployments placed on their service members. They do not hesitate to discuss the quantity of missions being performed or the number of countries their services have units deployed. In order to justify itself to Congress and the American Public, the military must appear visible and actively engaged. The military must be available for anything and everything that comes up so that it does not lose its *raison d'être*.

Throughout the 1990s the military's frenzied activity has provided an effective shield from any critical analysis from inside or outside the military as to whether America needs to have a large conventional force. There is a limit to the number of forest fires, volcanoes, hurricanes, riots, refugee camps, embassy evacuations, Olympic events, and other non-traditional missions the military can perform before taxpayers challenge the need for four air forces, four naval forces, two land forces, four space programs, three military academies, and a multitude of logistics systems. Equally susceptible to public scrutiny, is the service's increasingly expensive and sophisticated equipment plus the burdensome personnel costs, which are

bankrupting the nation's future. For example, a noted military analyst, Ralph Peters, stated:

... the world's most expensive military becomes grotesque when we, the people, are told that we need three new types of fighter aircraft that will cost more than \$350 billion, not counting long-term infrastructure costs. These outrageously expensive aircraft are narrow in purpose, lack an enemy, and will be too precious to use. In our strike on Afghanistan, old-fashioned B-52s . . . would have been ideal weapons.<sup>8</sup>

The Nation can not afford the luxury of continuing to allow the military's navy to possess its own army, which has its own air force.

## **REGIONAL THREATS**

The QDR, National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy documents project a stable and secure world with a number of uncertain and dangerous challenges through the years 2010 - 2015. These documents fail to quantify the threat and certainly do not justify the need for our present conventional force structure. While I agree with all of the threats identified within these documents, I believe that some of them are overstated. I will briefly address the regional threats and then discuss many of the key factors and influences that will dominate our culture and impact the military.

First of all, Iraq and Iran do not pose an immediate threat to our vital interests, and if they did, we would be forced to mobilize a large number of reserve forces to assist the active component. This in itself would obviate the need for a large standing force.

Conventional military threats in the Middle East are extremely limited. More likely threats from the region will probably originate from the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the willingness to use them. For example, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated the proclivity for employing chemical weapons and has been aggressively pursuing production and delivery means for both nuclear and biological weapons.

U.S. intervention in the Middle East is primarily due to its interest in the continuous flow of oil. While this should be an interest of the United States, it should no longer be categorized a vital interest, particularly not one to go to war over. Except possibly in the short-term, if a conflict or disagreement arises in the Middle East, oil supplies will continue to flow because economics will cause it to happen. It is not in anyone's best interest to halt oil deliveries, either from a buyer's or a belligerent supplier's point of view.

Unlike the oil embargo years of the 1970s, cash strapped Saudi Arabia and other middle-east oil producers are dependent upon uninterrupted oil revenues. Oil producing countries

continue to saturate the market and depress the price of oil because they are addicted to the cash and lifestyles that oil now provides them. The United States' reliance on middle-east oil has also dropped from over 50% prior to the oil crisis to only 16% currently. And, in the unlikely event that oil prices were to skyrocket, technology now exists to enable the U.S. to transfer from its dependence on fossil fuels to alternate energy sources. In the meantime, oil is cheap and plentiful and should not be an acceptable reason for the U.S. to go to war over.

In regard to middle-east interventionism, the United States cannot afford to hurtle itself into an Islamic quagmire over oil. The Gulf War was an anomaly; it's unlikely the U.S. will ever again be allowed 6 months to conduct a deployment and build-up in a benign staging area with the best air and seaports in the world. "Further U.S. conventional military action against Iraq is likely to remain episodic and confined to air and missile strikes - hardly a major theater war."<sup>14</sup>

North Korea is a legitimate conventional threat that must be closely monitored in the near term; however, by 2015 the communist regime will collapse from its own weight. Military analyst, Jeffery Record points out that:

[The] ... prospects for U.S. involvement in protracted conventional war against either North Korea or Iraq are considerably more remote than they were in 1950 and 1990, respectively. The North Korean military, though large and capable of inflicting immense damage

on Seoul, has little sustainability because of North Korea's economic ruin and because the Pyongyang regime no longer enjoys Russian or Chinese military support. Moreover, South Korea today has, as it did not in 1950, a declared and credible U.S. defense commitment backed by a standing U.S. military presence south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. And there is no comparison between the pathetically equipped and trained South Korea paramilitary forces of 1950 and today's large and powerful South Korean conventional forces.<sup>9</sup>

Many strategists agree that North Korea is about to implode and will eventually mirror the decline of the Soviet Union. A unification of the Korean peninsula is a very real possibility and should be accommodated by the U.S when the opportunity arises. In the worst case scenario, conventional demand on the U.S. military could be substantially reduced through a declared and credible nuclear weapons defense strategy that clearly communicates to the North Koreans that armed aggression against South Korea will not be tolerated.

Russia is no longer a conventional threat and will not become one by 2015. It continues to deteriorate as its failed attempt towards capitalism breaks down and propels the country back to a pre-industrial state. In the unlikely scenario that a faction becomes motivated in that country, a revolution would probably result, but any effects would be localized with minimal effect on global or regional stability. Furthermore, any political, social, or economic catharsis that could rid the country of its current ailments (organized crime, a barter

economy, alcoholism, and wide spread unemployment) would probably result in a more secure and stable outcome in the long run.

In regards to China, Record provides an insightful analysis:

The claim that China will emerge as America's next military peer competitor (and accordingly that we should begin "containing" Beijing now) is monumentally premature, and its very advancement risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. It assumes on China's part, three or four decades hence, a degree of hostility and measure of imperial ambition that is simply not predictable. It also assumes, in China, continued autocracy, peaceful political succession, national unity, and economic growth rates on the order of those sustained in the present decade. It ignores the great asymmetry of Chinese and U.S. military power in Asia as well as long-standing U.S. strategic aversion, reinforced by the Vietnam War, to participating in a large war on the Asian mainland. Any Chinese military attempt to overthrow U.S. interest in East Asia would require mastery of modern air and naval power - the two items in which the Chinese military is most deficient.<sup>10</sup>

These are the most likely major regional threats to U. S. security. There are other less likely contenders, but in each case, a similar strategy of non-confrontation by the U.S. would neutralize the danger. For early warning, intelligence assets are capable of tracking nations, who might start building their capabilities to threaten U.S. interests. This intelligence would provide U.S. leaders the forewarning necessary for them to rally support for the employment of various aspects of national

power. If the U.S. must resort to its military instrument of power against a hostile nation, it can rely on the historically proven method of partial or full mobilization, which has served the U.S. well throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The current strategy of maintaining large numbers of active conventional forces to respond to more than one MTW is fiscally irresponsible, given today's budgetary realities.

### **ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGES AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES**

Former Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, suggests that: "Since the end of the cold war, the public has lost most of its interest in foreign policy. While the elites seem eager to pay the price of serving as the world's principle stabilizing power, the public is indifferent, if not skeptical."<sup>11</sup> Americans have a tendency for avoiding military ventures, except when crucial national interests are at stake. The lack of tolerance for costly or protracted intervention was recently demonstrated by America's long delay before deploying troops to Bosnia, its quick pull out of Somalia, and its reluctance to send troops to Kosovo. This reemerging isolationist tendency results from the public's awareness of increasingly more volatile domestic issues that threaten the concept of the American dream and lifestyle. "Hot button" issues, such as social security, health care, the

federal deficit, trade imbalances, employment and retirement concerns have captivated the undivided attention of America's aging population and disenfranchised youth. Concerns for the environment, the economy, education, terrorism and illegal drugs are becoming increasingly more important to the public and the world community than military readiness and intervention. It will become increasingly easier for politicians to reduce military spending to pay for programs that have popular support and voter appeal. As a result, the military is on a slippery slope of financial peril.

In lieu of a traditional conventional threat, terrorism will become America's primary security concern as incidents and opportunities rise between now and 2015. Adversaries and potential belligerents learned a great deal from watching the U.S. employ its technical superiority in the Gulf War. In future operations they know they must employ indirect, asymmetric strategies. Terrorist events such as the 1983 Lebanon bombing, the Kobar Towers bombing, the Kenyan embassy bombing, and the ambush of Army Rangers in Mogadishu, strike at the Achilles' heel of America's conventional strength. While recent incidents have been isolated with a relatively low loss of American lives, it is only a matter of time before more lethal and successful means are employed against larger

population centers to exploit the terror aspects of asymmetric warfare.

Fully aware of the potential threat that exists, President Clinton just recently admitted that he often loses sleep at night, due to his concern regarding the potential terrorist employment of biological weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, in his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated:

I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology - not only missile - and are developing chemical and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long-range basis. So I think that it is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face within the coming years.<sup>12</sup>

The shock effect from a potentially devastating nuclear, biological or chemical threat from a rogue state or terrorist would be devastating to the public's morale and confidence. A catastrophic incident resulting from the demonstration of a weapon of mass destruction would greatly exacerbate the military's identity crisis since its conventional capability is ill suited for the task.

Military analyst, Ralph Peters argues that:

The systems on which American taxpayers will spend nearly a trillion dollars over the next few decades will have only limited utility against unconventional

threats armed with conviction and rage. Worse, we are, and will continue to be, unwilling to use most of those systems in any crisis short of conventional war. We continue to build a military to fight any enemy that no longer exists, while ignoring the enemies at our door.<sup>13</sup>

Precision guided weapons and poor intelligence resulted in political failure in Sudan. Record contends that: "The 'world's fourth largest army' proved less effective against U.S. forces in the Gulf in 1991 than did Mohammed Faraah Aideed's relative few, poorly equipped, and doped-up 'technicals' in Mogadishu just three years later."<sup>14</sup>

Instead of a conventional response, terrorist threats, like those emanating from Afghanistan, can best be addressed by a well-integrated international and domestic intelligence community and a responsive police-like force. Military analyst, Raymond Close stated: "The worst nightmare of our strategic military and security planners is that a small and weak enemy could hold us hostage by possessing a weapon of monstrous power, yet so insignificant in size and appearance that we cannot see it, cannot locate it, and therefore, cannot attack and destroy it."<sup>15</sup> To defend against the asymmetric threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the public will demand, and rightly so, that billions of dollars of DOD resources be shifted from tank, fighter aircraft, and combatant ship procurements to pay for state of the art anti-terrorist equipment and personnel.

Rand analyst, Ronald Asmus already sees a shift in U.S. public sentiment regarding national security interests. He states:

Americans are increasingly concerned about their country's economic security, and their concerns are, in turn, affecting American views on national security threats. A majority of Americans believe that the United States has lost its position as the world's leading power and that the critical future threats facing the country are likely economic. The public therefore sees a need for new priorities and a greater emphasis on domestic affairs over international issues. . . . The American public's desire to see greater attention paid to American economic security is matched by a desire to see the creation of a 'new world order' in which the United States should be willing to do its part-along with other allies - but not have to play the role of 'world policeman'.<sup>16</sup>

The future projections I have just made illustrate that whatever "spin" the military places on justifying its reason to exist it will not prevent inevitable erosion of its budget or conventional applicability. To avoid a public outcry and a demand for every last dollar from the military's already anemic budget, leaders must break the mold and legitimately downsize the military to meet America's needs for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. These leaders are faced with two primary options, continued evolutionary modifications or revolutionary changes to the force structure of the military to ensure its preparedness and relevancy to meet the challenges of 2015.

## EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Left to their own devices, the service chiefs will continue to follow a path of evolutionary change. This concept includes the gradual incremental change that already exists within the military and other large bureaucratic organizations. I am not suggesting that they will adhere to the status quo, because that implies no change. Fiscal pressures by themselves will ensure the chiefs implement changes. Forecasted shortfalls resulting from even the most optimistic proposals will force them to take a pragmatic approach to "right sizing", continued "salami slicing", the force that fits our defense system's modus operandi. This would be a reactionary method that responds slowly to the need for change as each faction of the military spends the majority of its effort defending its major weapons systems and force structure at the expense of the other services.

Regardless of the extent of these evolutionary changes, the services are too parochial to stray from their conventional foundation. It is also unlikely that they'll willingly admit to the need to respond to anything less than two nearly simultaneous MTWs. Retired U.S. Army Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., stated that: "[The] two-wars nonsense is a continuation of the two-and-a-half and one-and-a-half fandangos of the Cold

War."<sup>17</sup> "... claiming to be able to do what in fact it is unable to do, the United States is not only bluffing -- a most dangerous thing to do -- but even worse, is kidding itself into a false sense of security."<sup>18</sup>

Instead of arguing the relevancy of a two MTW scenario, senior military leaders continue to focus their energy defending their budgets based on this flawed strategy. No where in the Army Chief of Staff's recent statements to the Army Times does General Dennis Reimer challenge the need to be prepared for more than one MTW. His statements included:

. The Army is ready to fight and win one major theater war, but is likely to suffer massive casualties if it tries to fight and win a second one, according to Gen. Dennis Reimer. Plagued by materiel shortages, reductions in training and declining readiness, the Army would probably pay 'an extremely high cost in soldiers' lives' if it tried to fight two wars at once, as national military strategy demands, the Army chief of staff stated. '... Thirteen consecutive years of declining buying power' and an arduous operations tempo have left the Army with personnel shortages, deteriorating bases, too little money for training, aging weapons and ammunition shortages', Reimer said. 'The Army needs \$3 billion to \$5 billion more a year to begin overcoming problems that erode its ability to wage war', he said."<sup>19</sup>

Without severe outside pressure, the chiefs will continue to pursue change and cost savings through "salami slicing" each of their capabilities and providing minimal savings reductions while attempting to maintain the same roles and missions.

However, the service chiefs' reluctance to let go of the two MTW

scenario and still support real world contingencies with current budget realities is causing them to burn the candle at both ends.

To save money in future budget years under the evolutionary approach, the QDR suggests a number of infrastructure reductions and re-engineering initiatives that will occur through the year 2003. Under the evolutionary proposal, subsequent quadrennial defense reviews will continue to be conducted by the services to reassess right sizing opportunities and achieve proportional cost savings through the year 2015. Continued ties to conventional capability and the need to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs will prevent the services from changing force structure that achieves anything more than incremental cost reductions.

### **REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE**

In contrast to evolutionary changes to the military's force structure, a revolutionary option should be considered. This concept proposes a complete overhaul of the military services' roles and missions and a reorientation of the active force from conventional military operations to more flexible capabilities to meet the primary threat of terrorism and asymmetric challenges addressed earlier in this paper. To illustrate the

degree of revolutionary change proposed under this option, a "conceptual list" of major force change proposals is provided in the table below:

### REVOLUTIONARY "CONCEPT" PROPOSAL

- 1 - Eliminate 2 light divisions from the Army (retain the Airborne and the Airmobile Division).
- 2 - Transfer 2 MEFs from the Marines to the Army and deactivate 1 MEF.
- 3 - Transfer all armored and mechanized divisions from the active force to the reserve forces.
- 4 - Replace armored and mechanized divisions with 6 CONUS based armored cavalry brigades.
- 5 - Eliminate 5 aircraft carrier battle groups (retain 6 total) and 3 amphibious ready groups.
- 6 - Transfer 4 active Navy fighter wings to the reserves.
- 7 - Reduce combat ships and attack submarine forces to 64 and 37 respectively.
- 8 - Transfer 6 USAF fighter wings and 50% of bomber fleets to reserve forces.
- 9 - Eliminate 25% of all nuclear weapons platforms (air, land, and sea).
- 10 - Proportionately reduce support and administrative organizations and infrastructure.
- 11 - Reorganize and consolidate the services into 3 components (Land, Sea, and Aerospace).
- 12 - Eliminate overseas presence, except forces participating in United Nation's operations.

NOTE: This list is conceptual in idea only. It is not intended to be an all or nothing list that might cause the reader to take offense or be distracted from the overall theme of the revolutionary change proposal. While there is plenty of proposals on the list to alienate virtually every reader, regardless of service affiliation, its purpose is to illustrate the dramatic level of changes that should be considered under the evolutionary "concept".

Figure 1

In regards to the proposed force structure changes in the Army and Marine Components, two major themes are paramount. These include placing the heavy conventional force structure in

the reserve component while keeping the lighter more mobile forces in the active force. Specifically, the Army will no longer have heavy divisions in the active force and will have to rely more heavily on the Reserves for conventional responses to major theater wars. The active Army will possess two light divisions (one airborne and one airmobile capable), two medium divisions (redesignated and slightly reorganized Marine Expeditionary Forces) configured into air/ground task forces, and six relatively mobile (when compared to a heavy division), highly lethal and flexible armored cavalry regiments. All of the Army's forces would be CONUS based, allowing closure of virtually all overseas bases - a great cost saving initiative by itself.

The lighter, easily deployable land forces proposed under this concept will allow response to regional contingency operations to meet the threats expected through 2015. Should the unlikely need arise for larger conventional forces, mobilization of the reserve component's 26 divisions would be necessary.

Based on the threats anticipated for the next 20-30 years and the extended range of the Air Force, aircraft carrier battle groups have virtually lost their reason to exist. The carrier air force is expensive to maintain, redundant to land based aircraft, and extremely vulnerable to threats operating in the

carrier's new environment, the littorals. U.S. and allied air forces can project power virtually all over the world. The range and lethality of these aircraft have made carrier based forces obsolete in most parts of the globe. However, to provide capability in remote areas, some carriers in the force would help ensure worldwide availability of air support. But the need to project expensive carrier battle groups throughout the world in a manner practiced during the cold war and especially the last eight years is fiscally irresponsible. Proportional cuts in the Navy's combatant ships, submarine forces and fighter wings in the active force should also be made in conjunction with the proposed reduction of the carrier battle groups. Most of these forces, fighter wings and combatant ships in particular, should be transferred to the Reserve Naval Force.

Once the Air Force's requirements to be able to respond to two nearly simultaneous MTWs is eliminated, proposed cuts in the active force structure could be reduced significantly. As already stated, capability need only be equal to current and projected threat scenarios. Transferring approximately 50 percent of its active units to the reserves provides sufficient forces to meet current threat realities and ensure sufficient forces are available if the need for mobilization exists. The Air Force has been very successful in integrating reserves into its active missions. This is a unique attribute that should be

exploited more fully to reduce active force structure to a level appropriate for the post cold war era.

Nuclear deterrence is essential to the security of the United States. This capability not only serves to provide a balance among the world's nuclear powers, but it also provides an important element of deterrence to rogue states and emerging nuclear powers. Potential adversaries must remain wary of nuclear retaliation to prevent any possible exploitation or opportunism of any U.S. or allied conventional weakness. Rogue states contemplating the use of weapons of mass destruction must continue to feel vulnerable to retribution from a nuclear capable and credible U.S. response. While the U.S. must continue to remain a nuclear superpower, reductions in nuclear weapons platforms should be taken unilaterally, without waiting for the Russian Duma to approve the SALT II agreement. In fact, the U.S. can significantly reduce the number of its nuclear platforms and still possess a credible nuclear defense force, while providing considerable cost savings to the Nation.

The resulting infrastructure cuts associated with the force structure changes proposed in the revolutionary option would provide considerable cost savings. CONUS basing of forces would provide the most cost savings as overseas bases are closed or put into a care-taking status. Little or no savings will occur from base closures in the U.S. because of the amount of bases

and armories that will be needed for the significantly enlarged reserve components in the air, land, and sea components.

In conjunction with the base realignments and force structure decreases, the services should be reduced down to three components. The first consolidation would involve the land components, which can be achieved with great cost savings by merging the Army and Marine components. The second includes the merging of the Navy and the Coast Guard, only after enacting enabling legislation to resolve the current legal implications. And the third service would be designated the Aerospace component, which would include the merging of the U.S. Air Force and each of the other service's space organizations and missions. This consolidation will serve to eliminate wasteful redundancy and stovepipe organizations and procedures. Logistics and administrative infrastructures can be consolidated and reduced significantly. Procurement actions can also be consolidated resulting in administrative efficiency, standardization and interoperability, and quantity discount savings resulting from centralized purchasing.

The drastic cuts suggested above could be achieved to result in a 50% cut in the defense budget while maintaining a robust Research and Development (R & D) program. While the useful life of current weapons systems can and must be extended, new technologies can continue to be exploited in R & D for

weapons designs that can be put into production when needed.

Jeffery Record suggests:

Maintenance of conventional supremacy does not dictate buying large quantities of each and every new high-tech weapons system that comes along; strategic urgency vanished with the Soviet Union, and the United States can be more selective in the choice and timing of large military hardware production commitments. But it does require maintenance of significant conventional military forces as well as robust and stinting investment in research, development, testing, and integration of RMA and post-RMA technologies.<sup>20</sup>

This smaller, flexible, and highly mobile force is capable of providing response to non-traditional military requirements (civil disturbances, national disasters, drug interdiction, WMD, etc.) as well as limited conventional missions and operations other than war in support of U.S. interests and United Nation's cooperative security agreements.

#### **RECOMMENDATION AND SUMMARY**

Although it would be wholly unpopular with the military defense establishment and a seemingly naïve approach, I strongly recommend a serious consideration of revolutionarily changing the roles, missions, and organization of the military to the size and scope suggested in this paper. Political pressures and public sentiment will inevitably demand substantial downsizing. We have an option to tailor a force that adequately meets the

threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century as suggested by the revolutionary proposal or we can have a hollow, obsolete force resulting from continued budget driven "salami slicing".

Although NATO countries may probably object to this dramatic proposal, the world as a whole should be in favor of it. First of all, the U.S. will be able to participate in United Nation's security operations with more flexible and more mobile forces. The military's ability to perform Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) will be greatly enhanced and will ultimately become its *raison d'être*. Ultimately, support to UN peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace making operations should dramatically improve under this proposal.

Secondly, the world and especially the Islamic countries would feel less threatened by the "great American Satan" as the United States' "in your face" presence begins to dissipate throughout the world and especially in the middle-east. And lastly, virtually every country around the world has significantly reduced their military forces; therefore, it is reasonable to expect less overseas presence of foreign military organizations, including ones from the United States.

Worldwide networks of cooperation can be established to enhance security and eliminate terrorist threats. Global economies can prosper as countries follow the U.S. lead to further reduce their militaries and transition their industrial

production from guns to butter. The American public will feel more secure as the Nation places more of its precious resources into education, anti-drug programs, health care, social security and other popular social programs. Moreover, the American military establishment will receive renewed trust and confidence as it improves its capabilities to protect the Nation from the realities of asymmetric threats, while at the same time reducing its financial burden on taxpayers by as much as 50%. When the time comes to mobilize military forces and reinvigorate the military industrial base, Americans will rise to the occasion and provide the resources and moral support that will be needed.

"Until American leaders, including military, are willing to develop a coherent, realistic strategic framework, U.S. defense policy will flounder in attempts to justify the irrelevant."<sup>21</sup> We have an opportunity and a responsibility to restructure the military to meet America's needs through 2015. We can do this only by a revolutionary change that resists the immovable forces of the status quo and the pragmatic thinking of senior leaders intent on fighting the last war.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Jeffrey Record, "The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning," SSI Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, 450.

<sup>2</sup> The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington D.C.: The White House), October 1998, 22.

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Record, "The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning," SSI Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, 456.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 445.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense), September 1997, 1.

<sup>6</sup> The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington D.C.: The White House), October 1998, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense), May 1997, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Ralph Peters, "We Don't Have the Stomach for This Kind of Fight," The Washington Post, 30 Aug 1998, sec. C, p.1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 457

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 451.

<sup>11</sup> James R. Schlesinger, "Defense: Raise the Anchor or Lower the Ship," The National Interest, 53 (Fall 1998): 7.

<sup>12</sup> William S. Cohen, "Proliferation: Threat and Response." January 1997. Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html>>. Internet. Accessed 25 March 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Ralph Peters, "We Don't Have the Stomach for This Kind of War," The Washington Post, 30 Aug 1998, sec. C, p.1.

<sup>14</sup> Jeffrey Record, "The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning," SSI Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, 1998, 447.

<sup>15</sup> Raymond Close, "We Can't Defeat Terrorism With Bombs and Bombast," The Washington Post, 30 Aug 1998, sec. C, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, The New U.S. Strategic Debate (Santa Monica, CA: Rand), 1993: 230-231.

<sup>17</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr., The New World Strategy, A Military Policy for America's Future (New York: Simon & Schuster), 1995, 220.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 153.

<sup>19</sup> William Matthews, "Second Simultaneous War Would Cost Many Lives," Army Times, 19 Oct 98, 11.

<sup>20</sup> Jeffrey Record, "The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning," SSI Monograph, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, 462.

<sup>21</sup> Williamson Murray, "Preparing to lose the Next War?," Strategic Review 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 51.

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